High Court SLAPPs Litigant - Trinity's Jonathan Massey Explores Setu Kamal v Tax Policy Associates Ltd & Daniel Neidle [2026]

In Chambers’ latest Civil Update, Trinity's Jonathan Massey explores the recent High Court judgment in Setu Kamal -v- Tax Policy Associates Ltd and Daniel Neidle [2026] EWHC 551 (KB).

In this case, Mrs Justice Collins Rice declared that the Claimant’s claim was a strategic lawsuit against public participation (‘SLAPP’).

Legislative Background

In summary, section 195 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 defines a claim as a SLAPP if:

a) the claimant’s behaviour in relation to the matters complained of in the claim has, or is intended to have, the effect of restraining the defendant’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech;
b) any of the information that is or would be disclosed by the exercise of that right has to do with economic crime;
c) any part of that disclosure is or would be made for a purpose related to the public interest in combating economic crime; and
d) any of the behaviour of the claimant in relation to the matters complained of in the claim is intended to cause the defendant (i) harassment, alarm or distress, (ii) expense, or (iii) any other harm or inconvenience, beyond that ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation.

In determining whether a claim amounts to a SLAPP, the Court will ignore any lawful restrictions on the defendant’s freedom of speech. As Collins Rice J explained ‘it is to remove from the process of identifying a SLAPP any possibility of a claimant arguing that their claim or conduct cannot constitute a restraint of a defendant’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech because it seeks to restrain only speech which is by definition speech to which the defendant does not have a legal right.’

Insofar as material, CPR 3.4 (2) provides:

The Court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the Court...

(d) that, in the case of a claimant’s statement of case -

1. the claim is strategic litigation against public participation, being a SLAPP claim within the meaning of section 195 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023; and
2. the claimant has failed to show that it is more likely than not the claim would succeed at trial.

The Claim

On 26^th February 2025, the Second Defendant published an article about a tax scheme promoted by a firm called Arka Wealth. He noted that Arka Wealth worked with the Claimant - a tax barrister. In the article, the Second Defendant described Arka Wealth’s claims about the scheme on social media as ‘nonsense’ and said that the Claimant’s ‘arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts.’ The Claimant brought a claim for libel and malicious falsehood.

Collins Rice J struck out the malicious falsehood claim on the basis of defective pleadings. As to the libel claim, she entered summary judgment in the Defendants’ favour. This brought the Claimant’s claim to an end. However, the judge went on to consider whether she should declare the Claimant’s claim to be a SLAPP.

Was the Claim a SLAPP?

The judge held that the Claimant’s claim was a SLAPP. She found that:

• the Claimant was bringing a claim for libel and malicious falsehood thereby seeking to restrain the Defendants’ publication of the article - i.e., the Claimant was seeking to restrain the Defendants’ exercise of freedom of speech;
• the information that the Defendants disclosed in the article related to economic crime - in this case, the Second Defendant had reason to suspect that cheating the revenue may have occurred; and
• the article was published for a purpose related to the public interest in combating economic crime.

The judge then considered the final stage of the test - the Claimant’s intention and its impact upon the Defendants. She noted (at paragraph 156):

What converts a claim into a statutory SLAPP, however - its distinguishing feature and the public policy basis for Parliament’s intervention in the matter - is contained in the definition set out at section 195(1)(d). The SLAPP test is all about how litigation is conducted. It is a test of several parts, but with two striking features. The first is that it is made to depend on the intention of the claimant - it is a subjective test. The second is that that intention must relate to the causing to the defendant of various adversities or inconvenience ‘beyond that ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation’.

The judge held that the Claimant’s litigation behaviour (pre-action protocol failings, compliance failings, an ill-judged injunction application, and defective pleadings) could not be recognised as ‘properly conducted litigation’ and the behaviour caused the Defendants unwarranted and extra-ordinary inconvenience. The judge concluded that the Claimant’s intention was to (a) have a chilling effect on the Defendants’ journalism; and (b) interfere with the Defendants’ journalism. Against these findings, Collins Rice J declared that the Claimant’s claim was a SLAPP.

Comment

At present, the statutory scheme only applies to disclosure relating to economic crimes. It remains to be seen whether Parliament will legislate to tackle SLAPPs in other areas of civil litigation. That said, the Court’s case management powers are wide enough to restrain claims which are issued solely to shut down public debate. Accordingly, practitioners should expect the Courts to scrutinise litigation conduct more closely.