Somani Hotels Limited (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) v Epping Forest District Council [2025]

At 4.00pm on 1 September 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment on an appeal against the interim order of Eyre J in Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited [2025] EWHC 2183 (KB).

As a follow up to his previous analysis of the High Court decision, Trinity’s David Comb provides a review of the recent Court of Appeal's judgment.

Interim Injunction Applications and Planning Control - Or is Asylum Policy Paramount?

In Somani Hotels Limited (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) v Epping Forest District Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1134, the appeal of Somani Hotels Limited was allowed and the interim injunction imposed at first instance under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 quashed. This case note looks at the reasoning underpinning the Court of Appeal’s decision and the implications for planning authorities, businesses and practitioners.

Recap: The Bell Hotel, COVID and Housing Asylum Seekers

Since about 1900 The Bell has stood on the outskirts of Epping. It has 80 bedrooms for guests, a bar, restaurant and conference facilities. In March 2020, amidst the COVID 19 lockdown, The Bell closed its doors. Since then, from time to time, it has operated Home Office funded contracts to house asylum seekers. After a hiatus between April 2024 and April 2025, The Bell began to operate a new contract to house 138 asylum seekers. This development sparked public protest and propelled The Bell into the national spotlight.

Recap: Planning Injunctions: s187B Town and Country Planning Act 1990

At first instance, an application was brought by Epping Forest DC in its capacity as planning authority. The issue at the core of the case was s187B Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA), which provides:

“(1) Where a local planning authority consider it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise any of their other powers under this Part.

(2)  On an application under subsection (1) the court may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach.”

The defendant’s “apprehended breach of planning control” was a change of use at The Bell,  away from Class C1 ‘Hotel’. Put another way, the property had been “developed” pursuant to s55 TCPA in a manner that would require planning permission pursuant to s57 TCPA. Epping’s position was that such permission would not have been granted if sought.

At first instance, an injunction was granted on an interim basis, pending trial.

The Court of Appeal Judgment

Paragraphs 1-49 of the judgment in the Court of Appeal cover the background and set out the operative parts of Eyre J’s Judgment.

Intervention by the Secretary of State

Paragraphs 50-87 of the Court of Appeal judgment are then given over to the Secretary of States’ involvement in the proceedings. At first instance, Eyre J had refused joinder, a decision that was reversed on appeal. The applicable legal principles are contained in CPR 19.2 [64] and a host of familiar cases, most notably Pablo Star [2018] 1 WLR 738 [65]. The Court of Appeal reiterated that a liberal approach to joinder is appropriate, to enable a party whose legal rights are affected to be heard. Accordingly, the SSHD was permitted to participate in the appeal and this proved influential in determining the central issue.

American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396

The Balance of Convenience Reviewed on Appeal

The Court of Appeal began analysing the substantive merits by acknowledging that the decision of a first instance Judge in this context involves the exercise of a discretion and that an appellate Court should not lightly interfere with such a discretionary judgment.  The function of the appellate court is one of review, checking if there has been a misunderstanding as to the applicable law, or the evidence, or whether there was a change of circumstance. (See, [88] citing Hadmor Productions v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191).

However, the Court of Appeal upheld five grounds upon which the judgment at first instance was wrong in principle.

1. “Incentivising Protest” [116-119]. The SSHD argued and the Court accepted that it was wrong in principle to have regard to the incidence of public protest as a factor favouring the grant of an injunction. This was because it may incentivise future protests as a means of justifying more legal action.
2. “The wider picture” [120-121]. The SSHD argued (again) that “the Home Secretary’s statutory duty to provide accommodation [for asylum seekers] is a national duty requiring a structured response” and this was (again) accepted. The Judge at first instance had not given any (or sufficient) weight to the consequences, if injunctions of this type were available to local authorities: “The grant of an interim injunction incentivises local planning authorities who wish to remove asylum accommodation from their area to apply to the Court urgently before capacity elsewhere in the system becomes exhausted.”
3. “The status quo” [122-123]. The Court of Appeal reiterated that the point of departure on an application for interim injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo ante, or ‘hold the ring’. The Judge at first instance had given “very little weight” to this factor.
4. “Deliberate breach” [110-114]. There was a distinction in principle between a party who deliberately flouts planning enforcement action, and a situation where no enforcement action had been taken and a party essentially puts the planning authority to its election on enforcement. This was the latter scenario and not the former, therefore it was wrong to accord weight to a “deliberate breach” of planning enforcement by Sonami.
5. “Delay” [124-126]. This issue is linked to “deliberate breach” above. On 15 May 2025 Sonami had communicated to the planning authority that it had received advice suggesting a change of use certificate was not required. The next action of the planning authority was on 11^th August 2025, giving three days’ notice of the application for an interim injunction. There was no letter before claim. This was relevant to the issue of equitable relief.

Case Comment

It is submitted that the following pointers for practitioners may be digested from the Court of Appeal’s Judgment:

1. The Court of Appeal has reversed a first instance decision on interim relief. Accordingly, the Court was not required to decide and did not decide the issue of whether the conversion of an “Hotel” to asylum accommodation requires planning permission pursuant to ss55, 57 TCPA and the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987.
2. Nor was the Court required to consider whether enforcement notices and/or stop notices would be meritorious.
3. The Court has not foreclosed the possibility of a planning authority successfully injuncting a change in permitted use by means of s187B TCPA.
4. However, any application for an interim injunction against an ‘asylum hostel’ must have regard to “the wider picture” (the Secretary of State has a duty to find housing for asylum seekers on a national scale) and must not be justified by public protest, lest it “incentivise protest”.
5. The importance of preserving the status quo prior to trial (unless there are strong countervailing factors) must not be overlooked.
6. Planning authorities seeking interim injunctions must expect their own conduct to be scrutinised. If an authority has acquiesced in changed of use and is then perceived to react only to public unrest, this will likely count against the application.

The Court of Appeal emphasised at the outset that it was not concerned with the merits of government policy on housing asylum seekers, an axiomatic proposition that is nevertheless often overlooked. However as the Judgment illustrates, this must be distinguished with a very real concern about the importance of government policy (“the wider picture”) to judicial decision making in this area.

David Comb acts regularly on emergency applications for injunctive relief, and for local authorities, businesses and individuals in cases involving issues of planning control and the exercise of planning powers