Statements of Truth & Conducting Litigation: Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] – James McHugh

In the latest instalment of Chambers’ Civil Law Update, Trinity Business & Property barrister, James McHugh explores the recent High Court decision in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) which has the potential to have significant ramifications for the way in which practitioners conducting litigation and more specifically, the preparing and signing statements of truth for the purposes of CPR22.

The Facts

In this case the Respondent (Charles Russell Speechlys LLP) carried out some legal work for the Appellants (Mrs Julia Mazur & Mr Jerome Stuart). The Respondent’s fee of £54,263.50 was not paid and debt recovery proceedings were commenced. The Respondent instructed another firm, Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (‘GBS’), to issue the claim.

The Particulars of Claim were signed by Mr Peter Middleton who held the title of ‘Head of Commercial Litigation’ at GBS. The Claim was defended by the Appellants who lodged a Defence and Counterclaim. One of the issues taken by the Appellants was the fact that Mr Middleton (the signatory of the PoC and the person who they thought was conducting the litigation) did not hold a current practising certificate. The Appellants subsequently applied for directions, including an order that Mr Middleton be replaced with a qualified solicitor.

DDJ Campbell sitting in the County Court at Brighton ordered that the proceedings be stayed. As part of the order it was specified that any application by the Respondent to lift the stay would need to include a full explanation from a partner at GBS of the position.

The Respondent applied to lift the stay and the matter came before His Honour Judge Simpkiss.

GBS accepted that Mr Middleton was not entitled to conduct reserved activity but that he had done so under the supervision of an ‘authorised person’. They also asserted that in the intervening period Mr Middleton’s involvement in the proceedings had come to an end and that he had been replaced by a qualified solicitor with a full practising certificate.

HHJ Simpkiss decided to lift the stay but ordered that the Respondent should file an amended Claim Form and Particulars of Claim verified by a statement of truth from someone at GBS who was duly authorised to do so.

In his judgment HHJ Simpkiss cited the fact that the SRA had confirmed in a letter dated 2^nd December 2024 that Mr Middleton had authority to conduct litigation under the supervision of a partner Mr Robert Ashall. The relevant section of the letter from the SRA read as follows:

“Goldsmith Bowers Ltd is authorised under the Legal Services Act 2007 arrangements as it is a firm authorised and regulated by the SRA under the powers delegated to it under the Act. Its employees are permitted to undertake ‘reserved activities’ due to section 21(3). We are satisfied that Mr Middleton has not conducted a reserved legal activity without entitlement to do so, so are satisfied no further action is required on this occasion.”   

The Appeal

On appeal the High Court was essentially required to determine two questions:

1. Did HHJ Simpkiss err in deciding that Mr Middleton was authorised to conduct litigation under supervision?
2. Did HHJ Simpkiss err in making an award of costs against the Appellants?

For the purposes of this article we will focus on the first aspect of the judgment and not the issues in relation to costs.

Both the Law Society and the SRA were invited to intervene in the appeal and provided written submissions to the Court before judgment was given.

In his judgment at Paragraphs 48 & 49 Mr Justice Sheldon stated the following in relation to the question of whether Mr Middleton was entitled to conduct litigation under the supervision of and authorised person:

“48. The short answer to this question is “no”: Mr Middleton was not entitled to conduct litigation under the supervision of Mr Ashall. The learned judge’s conclusion to the contrary, in reliance on the SRA’s letter of 2 December 2024, was therefore an error of law.

 49. In their submissions to this Court, the SRA have disavowed the suggestion that this was permitted by section 21(3) of the LSA. They were right to do so. Mere employment by a person who is authorised to conduct litigation is not sufficient for the employee to conduct litigation themselves, even under supervision. The person conducting litigation, even under supervision, must be authorised to do so, or fall within one of the exempt categories. In my judgment, this is the proper construction of the LSA.”

Sheldon J went on in the judgment to consider the wording of Sections 15 & 16 of the Legal Services Act 2007 and observed that the LSA separates out the entitlement of employees (E) to carry out reserved legal activities from that of their employer (P). If E was entitled to carry out reserved legal activities merely because they worked for P, section 16 would make no sense.

Finally, it was clear from the judgment that in their letter dated 2^nd December 2024 the SRA had conflated the term ‘regulated person’ for the purposes of s.21(3) LSA with the term ‘authorised person’ for the purposes of s.18 LSA. The judgment is clear that s.21(3) LSA does not extend the scope of those individuals who are authorised to carry out reserved legal activities.

Sheldon J did not make a finding on the issue of whether, in fact, Mr Middleton had conducted litigation stating it would be inappropriate to do so on the basis that it could interfere with any regulatory intervention from the SRA and that Mr Middleton was not a party to the appeal.

Comment

This decision has already caused a significant amount of concern amongst practitioners and has the potential to disrupt the business models of a number of firms, particularly those working in high volume/fixed cost sectors and local authorities/third sector legal departments.

Whilst the judgment is clear that non-authorised persons can still ‘assist’ with litigation practitioners will need to be very wary that paralegals or other employees are not inadvertently committing a criminal offence by crossing the line into conducting litigation.

There is no specific definition of ‘Conducting Litigation’ beyond the one set out in Schedule Two of the Legal Services Act 2007 which states:

‘The “conduct of litigation” means: 

(a) the issuing of proceedings before any court in England and Wales,

(b) the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings, and

(c) the performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings (such as entering appearances to actions).

Per the Court of Appeal in Ndole Assets Ltd v. Designer M&E Services UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2865 the question of whether an individual is ‘conducting litigation’ is one of fact and degree in each case.

It is not difficult to imagine a raft of satellite litigation now taking place where cases have significant involvement from Grade D Fee Earners and there is a question over whether their work amounts to ‘conducting litigation’.

A particular concern arises from the application of CPR22.1(6) and the associated Practice Direction.

CPR22.1(6) sets out that in the case of a ‘statement of case’ this must be signed either by the party/their litigation friend or the legal representative on behalf of the party/their litigation friend. The definition of ‘Legal Representative’ is found at CPR2.3(1) and includes a ‘solicitor’s employee’.

The Practice Direction to CPR22 at Para 3.10(3) explicitly states that ‘An employee of a solicitor or firm of solicitors in private practice representing a party is within the definition of legal representative in Rule 2.3(1) and may sign a statement of truth.’

Whilst there is no definitive appellate authority on the issue it is difficult to see how signing a statement of truth would not fall within the scope of ‘conducting litigation’ for the purposes of the LSA. Whilst current BSB guidance is that signing a statement of truth does not amount to conducting litigation for Barristers’ regulatory purposes this guidance is based on a non-binding decision of the High Court sitting as Visitors to the Inns of Court in a regulatory appeal and based on Mazur and commentary in the White Book on the topic it is my view that for the purposes of the LSA signing a statement of truth on behalf of a party could easily fall within the scope of conducting litigation. 

This leaves us in the potentially bizarre situation where a ‘non-authorised’ person employed by a firm of solicitors could sign a statement of truth in accordance with the CPR but at the same time be potentially committing a criminal offence under the LSA.

Significant care will need to be taken by practitioners to protect themselves and/or their employees from potential liability and it appears likely that serious consideration will need to be given to the CPR as currently drafted. Further appeals on this matter seem almost inevitable.