Trinity Housing Barrister Summary of Hodge v Folkestone & Hythe District Council [2023]

Trinity Social Housing Law barrister, Henry Percy-Raine has prepared the following summary of the recent Court of Appeal decision of Hodge v Folkestone & Hythe District Council [2023] EWCA Civ 896.

This was an appeal against a decision at first instance to dismiss Ms Hodge’s appeal against a decision of the Council that she was intentionally homeless for the purposes of section 191(1) Housing Act 1996. The key question in this appeal was what constitutes 'accommodation' for the purposes of section 191(1) HA 1996.

The Facts

Ms Hodge had a significant history of difficulties with her mental health. In 2015, she moved into a studio flat (‘the Room’) in a hostel run by a charity. She occupied the Room under a written licence. The charity aimed to provide temporary supported accommodation for single homeless persons while they look for more permanent accommodation.

In 2016, Ms Hodge left the flat in the hostel of her own accord to live with family members. In 2020, she rented a flat from a friend before leaving that flat in 2021. She thereafter slept in a car. In May 2021 she applied to the Council for accommodation as a homeless person.

In a review of its original decision, the Council was satisfied that Ms Hodge had become homeless intentionally ‘due to having sought voluntarily to vacate supported housing which would otherwise have led to a later offer of secure housing’. The Council was also satisfied that this decision was made knowing the future implications of giving up supported housing and that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the Room rather than giving it up [51].

The Appeal

Ms Hodge was granted permission to appeal on two issues: (i) whether the Room was ‘accommodation’ for the purposes of section 191(1) of the 1996 Act and (ii) whether the Room had to be ‘settled accommodation’ or not.

The Court of Appeal was bound by authorities (R v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484, Birmingham City Council v Ali [2009] UKHL 3, and R v Brent London Borough Council ex p Awua [1996] AC 55) which held that whether the place which an applicant happens, or happened, to occupy is, or was, ‘accommodation’ for the purpose of section 191(1) is a question of fact for the Council, subject to Wednesbury (ie Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223). Further, whether it is reasonable for an applicant to continue to occupy temporary accommodation is also a question of fact for the Council, subject to Wednesbury. Finally, in order to qualify as accommodation for the purposes of Part VII, there is no requirement that accommodation be ‘settled’ [73].

Applied to the facts, it was held that the Council understood the legal position and was entitled to arrive at the decision reached on the facts of this case [76-78]. Although strictly, it was unnecessary for the Council to have examined the question of whether the room was ‘settled’ on the facts, this concept was only relevant as an analytical tool, in effect, if it helped on the issue of causation [78].

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as the Council was entitled to decide that Ms Hodge was intentionally homeless.