Housing Barrister Summary of R (On the application of Dwaine Campbell) v London Borough of Ealing [2023]

Trinity Social Housing Law barrister, Patience Abladey has prepared the following summary of the recent case of R (On the application of Dwaine Campbell) v London Borough of Ealing [2023] 10 (Admin).

The Claimant sought judicial review of the decision of 28 February 2022 (“the Decision”) of London Borough of Ealing (“the Council”) to withdraw its funding of the Claimant’s bed and breakfast accommodation  (“the temporary accommodation”).

Facts

The Claimant suffers from Retinitis Pigmentosa, a condition which is progressive; he is partially sighted and suffers from obsessive compulsive disorder and depression. The Claimant was accommodated in the Council’s area by the London Borough of Hillingdon (“Hillingdon“) pursuant to its duty under Part VII of the Housing Act. The Claimant subsequently failed to pay his rent and was evicted. Thereafter, Hillingdon placed the Claimant in temporary accommodation in a hotel in Southall. Hillingdon treated its housing duty as having been discharged on 3 February 2016.

As the Claimant was a “disabled man who was at imminent risk of being made homeless”, the Council took over the funding of the Claimant’s accommodation at the hotel, pursuant to the exercise of its discretion under section 19(3) of the Care Act, pending completion of an assessment. There were assessments completed in February and October 2016, respectively, which both concluded that the Claimant had eligible needs. On 18 July 2016, the hotel gave notice to the Claimant that he must leave. On 20 July 2016 the Council arranged for the Claimant to move to a guest house, until 5 October 2016, when the Council then moved the Claimant to temporary accommodation (private rented sector accommodation) on the basis that the Claimant’s allocated social worker and a sensory and visual impairment worker concluded that the guest house accommodation was too small for the Claimant.

There was a further assessment undertaken on 26 November 2020. It recorded that the primary concerns raised by the Claimant related to the unsuitability of the temporary accommodation. It was concluded that without support to meet the identified needs, the Claimant’s wellbeing would be negatively impacted upon. The identified needs were, however, being met by the Claimant’s partner and family at that time, and for this reason, the Claimant declined the provision of managed care or direct payments by the Council.

On 19 November 2021 the Claimant brought a claim against the Council in the county court for breach of the Equality Act (“the Discrimination claim”). The Discrimination claim alleged that the Defendant treated the Claimant in a directly and indirectly discriminatory manner, as a result of which he has spent several years living in accommodation which is not suitable for his needs as a disabled person.

On 28 February 2022, the Council informed the Claimant’s solicitors that it had taken the decision to withdraw funding of the temporary accommodation, such decision to take effect from 25 April 2022.

The Claimant’s grounds of challenge were:

1. Ground 1. He has, at all material times, had a need for care and support under the Care Act, which requires the provision of accommodation for its effective delivery; and by withdrawing funding for provisions of accommodation, the Defendant erred in concluding either that it did not owe a duty to provide, or fund provision of, accommodation under the Care Act, or in failing to conduct a proper assessment addressing the issue of whether it owed a duty to provide such accommodation.
2. Ground 2(a). The Decision was irrational, took account of irrelevant matters and failed to take account of relevant matters.

• Ground 2(b). The Decision was taken for an improper purpose.

1. Ground 2(c). The Decision was taken in breach of the Equality Act 2010 in that it amounted to victimisation contrary to section 27 of that Act.

The Defendant contended that the Claimant was not entitled to the provision of accommodation under the Care Act because he is eligible for housing under either Part VI or Part VII of the Housing Act. The Claimant has never been assessed as having a care and support need for accommodation, and his care and support needs are not accommodation related. An Equality Act claim is the subject of ongoing proceedings in the county court; and the decision to withdraw funding of the Claimant’s accommodation was not taken for an improper purpose, nor does it amount to victimisation.

Decision

The High Court allowed the claim for judicial review on Grounds 1, 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c). The Claimant contended that the Decision was taken for an improper purpose, namely:

• In response to his decision to issue a claim against the Defendant for breach of the Equality Act 2010; and/or
• To deter him from pursuing that Claim; and/or
• Putting pressure on him to source alternative accommodation independently.

It was also submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the Decision amounts to victimisation of the Claimant, contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010.

The Judgment considered Grounds 1 and 2(a) first which concerned the proper approach to the provision of social care and support to individuals in need.

As to Grounds 1 and 2(a), the following points were made:

• Since the Council neither had a duty nor power under the Care Act to provide the Claimant with accommodation, or to fund the Claimant’s accommodation, the decision to withdraw funding cannot be said to have been irrational. However, given that the previous assessments of the Claimant’s needs for care and support took place through the prism of the Claimant’s accommodation being funded by the Defendant, the withdrawal of such funding leads to the obvious conclusion that there should be a further assessment of the Claimant’s needs, viewed outwith the aforementioned prism. However, it was concluded that the Council did not act unlawfully in failing to undertake such an assessment prior to issuing the Decision under challenge, particularly in light of the fact that the Claimant was provided with eight weeks’ notice of the withdrawal of funding and, the Claimant is still living in the temporary accommodation funded by the Defendant.

As to Grounds 2(b) and 2(c)the following points were made:

• The Council’s decision to withdraw funding of the Claimant’s accommodation was not significantly influenced by the Claimant lodging the Discrimination claim against the Defendant. The Claimant’s claim of victimisation under the Equality Act, as pleaded under Ground 2(c), failed.
• The decision to withdraw the funding was not taken for an improper purpose. The purpose of the Decision was to encourage the Claimant to pursue the options available to him under the Housing Act to obtain alternative accommodation, and that is not an improper purpose.
• The Defendant had no duty or power to maintain funding of the Claimant’s accommodation under the Care Act and the resolution of the Claimant’s housing was properly to be addressed under the Housing Act.

In conclusion, it was found that the Council’s Decision was not unlawful and the Claimant’s application for judicial review was dismissed.